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During the Great Recession mass demonstrations indicated weakened
political support in Europe. We show that growing dissatisfaction re-
flects poor economic conditions; unemployment is particularly impor-
tant. Using individual level data for 16 Western European countries for
1976-2010, we find that national economic performance even matters be-
yond personal economic outcomes. Finally, while effects of growth and
unemployment rates are the same across demographic subsets, the effect
of inflation is heterogeneous. Younger, well-educated, or working indi-
viduals put relatively higher weight on price stability than the elderly,
less skilled or not working. Our findings reinforce the political impor-
tance of employment and growth policies.
Keywords: Political support, Satisfaction with democracy, Growth,
Unemployment, Collectivism
JEL codes: H11, O43, P16
∗We thank Hans-Peter Grüner for encouraging this work. We also thank Dirk Engelmann, Lisan-
dra Flach, Christina Gathmann, Niklas Potrafke, Benjamin Protte and seminar participants at
the University of Mannheim, the 2010 Silvaplana Workshop on Political Economy, the ECPR
graduate conference 2010 (Dublin), and the annual meeting of the Verein für Socialpolitik 2011
(Frankfurt) for helpful discussions and comments. Gesa Langer provided excellent research
assistance. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemein-
schaft (DFG) through SFB 884 “Political Economy of Reforms”.
†Department of Economics, University of Mannheim, D-68131 Mannheim. Email: janafriedrich-
sen@gmail.com.
‡Department of Economics, University of Mannheim, D-68131 Mannheim. Email:
philipp.zahn@mail.uni-mannheim.de.
1
1. Introduction
During the Great Recession since 2007 European countries such as Spain, Greece,
Portugal, and Ireland have experienced a phase of economic hardship unprecedented
in the last decades. In Spain, for instance, the unemployment rate increased by 11.4
percentage points between 2006 and 2010. Following the economic downturn were
the political repercussions: Mass demonstrations took place in many cities as people
wanted to express their dissatisfaction with the economic situation and how it was
dealt with1. Until late 2011 the five EU member countries which were hit hardest
economically, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, had overturned their gov-
ernments. Political actors as well as observers noted that democratic institutions
themselves could suffer under adverse economic conditions. For instance, in summer
2010, the president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, expressed
his fear that “democracy might disappear” (Groves, 2010) in the most heavily af-
fected Southern European countries; macroeconomic conditions could worsen to an
extent that would be impossible to deal with for governments and would therefore
make them susceptible to popular uprisings (Groves, 2010). Survey data from the
Eurobarometer, using ‘satisfaction with democracy’ (SWD) as a measure of atti-
tudes towards democracy, shows indeed that in the phase of economic downturn
peoples’ attitudes have worsened substantially. In Spain, for instance, satisfaction
with democracy decreased by about 20 percentage points between 2006 and 2010.
In this paper we show that the economic harshness during the last years can, to
a large extent, explain the observed deterioration of satisfaction with democracy.
Moreover, growing dissatisfaction reflects a pattern already present before 2007, a
positive relationship between economic performance and satisfaction with democ-
racy. Combining individual-level survey data on SWD with country-level data on
growth, inflation, and unemployment from 1976 to 2010 for sixteen Western Euro-
pean countries, we find that national economic performance does affect individuals’
attitudes towards democracy and the effects are non-negligible in size. Using es-
timation results from data collected before 2007 a drop in the order of 19 to 24
percentage points in satisfaction with democracy was to be expected for countries
which experienced substantially lower growth and higher unemployment rates than
during normal times. These estimates compare well with the decreases of around
20 percentage points measured for Ireland, Greece, and Spain. We also correctly
predict Portugal to be an outlier; Based on economic data we estimate a decrease
of 5.86 percentage points in satisfaction scores while the observed decrease was 4
percentage points.
While we find both growth and unemployment rates to be significant, the latter are
quantitatively much more important for SWD. When the growth rate decreases by
one standard deviation, SWD is on average 3 percentage points lower; a standard
deviation increase in unemployment, however, comes about with a decrease of 7
percentage points. This finding illustrates why “jobless growth” as a policy outcome
is problematic and why politicians might want to focus on employment policies even
though growth is also important to ensure citizens’ support.
1Examples of the broad media coverage of the protests are Donadio & Sayare (2011) and Tremlett
& Hooper (2011).
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The contribution to the literature is fourfold. First, the time frame chosen allows
us to show the regularity behind political protest in times of economic crisis: People
get less satisfied with a democratic system during economic slowdown. The effects
on political support were stronger in recent years because the economic turmoil was
more severe than ever before. Second, we show that macroeconomic variables and
personal controls are simultaneously influential and we assess their relative impor-
tance. Resorting to individual level data uncovers important drivers of satisfaction
with democracy, which remain undetected in national-level analyses. In particular,
individual unemployment, education, age, and perceived life satisfaction are signifi-
cant correlates. Third, we present evidence against a pure self-interest explanation
of political support: growth and unemployment rates exhibit homogeneous effects on
SWD, even though their real implications differ across subgroups of the population.2
Finally, since we include several macroeconomic indicators at the same time, we can
also assess the robustness of previous work relying on subsets of these indicators.
In section 2, we relate our research to the existing literature. In section 3 we
summarise our hypotheses (3.1), describe the dataset (3.2) and introduce our em-
pirical model (3.3). We present our results in section 4 and discuss implications
with respect to a self-interest explanation of political support and a policy trade-
off between inflation and unemployment (Phillips curve) in section 5. We present
robustness checks in section 6 and conclude in section 7.
2. Related Literature
Satisfaction with democracy is part of the broader concept of political support.
Support can be simply affectional (acceptance or identification with an entity) or it
can derive from satisfaction with its outputs (Easton, 1957). Norris (1999b) distin-
guishes the following five dimensions: political community, regime principles, regime
performance, regime institutions, political actors. Research on political support (see,
e.g., Norris (1999a) for an introduction) often focuses on government popularity as
a dependent variable and thus refers to the most specific dimension: ‘political ac-
tors’. However, during severe economic crises more than the competence of current
governments is called into question. SWD is then a more suitable indicator of polit-
ical support since it gives us an evaluation of ‘system performance’.3 SWD has the
additional advantage of being less influenced by personal sympathy for politicians
or ideological attachment to a specific party.
There is some evidence that voters evaluate macroeconomic outcomes retrospec-
tively and vote accordingly in subsequent elections but also prospective voting has
been proposed as an explanation and received some empirical support. Since this
literature is very broad, we refer the interested reader to the surveys on vote and
popularity functions by Nannestad & Paldam (1994) and “Voting and the Macroe-
conomy” by Hibbs (2006). Revolutionary action or political extremism are likely to
indicate the absence of political support and constitute another facet of the related
literature. Brückner & Grüner (2010) find a negative relationship between growth
2Inflation in contrast exhibits heterogeneous effects but is insignificant for parts of the population.
3See also Dalton (1999) who argues that SWD gives an instrumental evaluation of the performance
of democracy.
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and right-wing extremist voting at the aggregate level for 16 Western European
countries. Moving to the micro-level, Lubbers et al. (2002) show how support of ex-
treme right-wing parties increases with unemployment for the same set of countries.
MacCulloch & Pezzini (2007) employ survey data from 64 countries and provide
evidence that the preference for revolution increases when the economy performs
poorly.4
Previous work employing the same indicator as we do, SWD, often uses data
aggregated at the national level or covers relatively short time periods. Results
thereby rely to a large extent on cross-country variation and individual characteris-
tics are ignored.5 Furthermore, there is hardly any systematic evidence on the role
of macroeconomic factors. Using national-level data, Wagner et al. (2009) find sig-
nificant effects of institutional quality on the satisfaction with democracy and Clarke
et al. (1993) document effects of inflation and unemployment. We are aware of only
two studies in SWD employing individual-level data: Halla et al. (2011) investigate
the role of environmental policy for individuals’ satisfaction with democracy, while
Wells & Krieckhaus (2006) study the effect of corruption on democratic satisfaction.
The latter study uses only few points in time and cannot properly take into account
changes in national economic conditions over time.6 To the best of our knowledge
only Halla et al. (2011) use a long time dimension combined with individual level
data but their data ends in 2001 and thus excludes the recent years. Wagner et al.
(2009) and Halla et al. (2011) do include several macro-economic indicators simul-
taneously but do not discuss the economic relevance and relation between those.7
In this paper we build on these studies and extend them in several dimensions. We
compile a dataset covering 16 Western European countries for the period from 1976
to 2010. We thereby extend the sample used by Halla et al. (2011) by another decade.
We also use variation in country-specific economic conditions over time in addition to
cross-country variation. The use of individual-level data with a long time dimension
allows controlling for important factors at the individual level such as sex, age, and
labour force status; we abstract from cultural differences in political attitudes by
using country-fixed effects. We show how important individual characteristics are in
determining democratic satisfaction and relate our results to findings from aggregate
level studies. Furthermore we discuss the role of various macroeconomic factors and
show how previous findings depend on the selection of only a subset of them.
4Both, Brückner & Grüner (2010) and Lubbers et al. (2002), use data from the Eurobarometer
as we do. While the latter only rely on few data points in time, the former use the Mannheim
trend file covering 1970 to 2002. In contrast, MacCulloch & Pezzini (2007) employ three waves
of the World Value Survey for their analysis.
5Satisfaction with democracy is an individual attitude and depends on individual characteris-
tics, which are therefore crucial in the analysis of determinants of democratic support. While
aggregate-level analyses can, in principle, incorporate individual characteristics as averages,
this is not usually done but the individual dimension is left out completely. In contrast, we
explicitly take into account the individual level information which the Eurobarometer provides.
6All of these studies rely on data from the Eurobarometer for Western European countries. Wells
& Krieckhaus (2006) also consider Central and Eastern European countries.
7The former study by Wagner et al. (2009) uses the average of the ordinal SWD score as dependent
variable. Due to the ordinality of SWD it is problematic to interpret their results quantitatively.
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3. Hypotheses, data and model specification
3.1. Hypotheses
Earlier research posited a link from macroeconomic performance to political support
based on the presumption that “voters hold the government responsible for economic
events” (Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000, Responsibility Hypothesis) without detailing
the channels of influence. A plausible mechanism, which we believe also applies
to satisfaction with democracy, is the following: Economic conditions determine
future well-being. Growth increases expected income, inflation reduces the real
value of wealth and income, and higher unemployment implies higher risk of job
or income loss. Therefore, individuals value, e.g., high growth as an indicator of
increasing national welfare and high inflation and high unemployment as signs of
decreasing welfare. Going beyond the theory of pure self-interest, individuals may
also care about the well-being of others. Macroeconomic performance illustrates
the democratic system’s capacity to provide collective well-being. This constitutes
another reason for economic performance to increase individuals’ satisfaction with
democracy.
Based on the preceding argument we expect that, ceteris paribus, an individual’s
democratic satisfaction is
• increasing in national growth,
• decreasing in inflation and unemployment.
Furthermore, we expect that individual income and employment status have similar
effects. We hypothesise that an individual’s democratic satisfaction is
• increasing in individual income,
• lower in case of personal unemployment.
Moreover, we expect a strong positive correlation between general life satisfaction
and satisfaction with democracy. We believe individuals do not perfectly discrim-
inate between their personal lives and their political surroundings when asked for
their subjective evaluations. For instance, individuals who are generally optimistic
and very happy, should on average also be more positive towards democracy. Thus,
we expect an individual’s democratic satisfaction to be
• increasing in general life satisfaction.
More generally, we expect that democratic satisfaction has similar determinants as
has life satisfaction. We therefore adopt hypotheses from the happiness literature.8
We hypothesise that an individual’s democratic satisfaction is higher if he or she is
married, better educated, out of the labour force and richer, and less satisfied when
he or she is unemployed or male.
8For the macroeconomic variables the happiness literature supports the hypotheses stated above.
See for instance Frey & Stutzer (2002a).
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3.2. Data
Our analysis combines survey data with national macroeconomic data in 16 coun-
tries for up to 33 years. Individual level data was obtained from the Eurobarometer
and macroeconomic data from the OECD (2011). Descriptive statistics for all in-
cluded national and individual variables are displayed in tables A.2 and A.3. The
tables show variation in the dependent variable ‘SWD’ as well as in the explana-
tory variables ‘growth’, inflation’, and ‘unemployment’ within countries over time.
Figure 1 illustrates that SWD varies over time. Furthermore, it reveals that there
are substantial differences in levels of SWD across countries possibly due to cultural
idiosyncrasies. Exact variable definitions can be found in table A.1.
3.2.1. Individual level variables: the Eurobarometer
The Eurobarometer data set is a repeated cross section of individuals in the Euro-
pean Union (EU). It covers five of the six founding EU members in 1970 (France,
Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Italy) since 1970, Luxembourg is included since
1973, and other countries were added when they joined the European Union, re-
spectively when official negotiations for accession began. In every wave, about 1000
respondents per country complete the questionnaires. We use the Mannheim Eu-
robarometer Trend File 1970-2002 (European Commission, Brussels, 2008) and ap-
pend nine additional waves to extend the dataset until 2010 (European Commission,
Brussels, 2002, 2003, 2004a,b, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010).
As indicator of support for democracy we used ‘satisfaction with democracy’ or
SWD. This indicator refers to the following question: ‘On the whole, are you very
satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democ-
racy works in <country>?’.9 This question asks, in line with our research interest,
how people evaluate their democracy’s current performance and not whether they
are in favor of the democratic idea per se.
The variable SWD was collected for the first time in 1973 and then every year
from 1976 to 2010 except for the years 1996 and 2008. Our sample comprises
France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany (since 1991 including East Germany),
Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Greece (included since
1981), Spain and Portugal (both included since 1985), Norway (included 1990-1995),
Finland (included since 1993), Sweden and Austria (both included since 1995).
From the Eurobarometer we also obtain standard demographic controls as well as
information on general life satisfaction. In contrast to the other controls, the latter
is not an objective measure but an attitudinal statement: People were asked how
satisfied they are with their lives.10
9<country> is replaced by the name of the country in which the respondent was interviewed.
10Analogously to satisfaction with democracy there are four answer categories: 1=not at all satis-
fied, 2=not very satisfied, 3=fairly satisfied, 4=very satisfied. We constructed dummies, where
‘not at all satisfied’ represents category 1, ‘satislife2’ category 2 etc. The omitted category is
3, people indicating to be fairly satisfied with their life.
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3.2.2. National level variables
Macroeconomic data was obtained from the OECD. Total GDP (constant prices),
GDP per capita, inflation rates, and unemployment rates were downloaded from
the OECD database OECD.StatExtracts, which is available online. We transform
GDP per head to GDP per head in 1000 US$ (constant prices, constant PPPs),
for ease of interpretation of coefficients. Since the distribution of inflation is very
skewed we would like to use a log-transformation as, e.g., Wagner et al. (2009) do
but a log-transformation is only feasible for positive observations. Around 2009
and 2010, however, Belgium, Ireland, Portugal, and Ireland experienced negative
inflation rates. In order not to lose these observations, we adopt a hybrid function
of inflation as proposed by Khan & Ssnhadji (2001):
f(inflationit) = (inflationit − 1)1inflationit≤1 + log(inflationit)1inflationit>1 (1)
The function f(inflationit) is linear in inflationit for values of inflation rates below
or equal to one and logarithmic for inflation rates greater than one. The breakpoint
one is chosen such that the transformation is continuous.
For robustness checks we also employed “The Comparative Political Data Set 1960-
2007” by Armingeon et al. (2009). It contains political and institutional variables on
a (mostly) annual basis for 23 democratic countries for the period of 1960 to 2007.
From this dataset we extracted information on national budget deficits, national
government debt, and the share of social transfers.
3.3. Model setup and specification
Our model employs data at the individual level instead of country averages. This
allows us to include individual level characteristics. We estimate a linear probability
model using the following equation:
SWDitc = β0 +macrotcβ1 + individualitcβ2 + fet + fec + uitc (2)
where observations are indexed by i for individuals, by c for the country in which
the individual participated in the survey, and by t for the year of the survey. The
dependent variable ‘SWD’ as well as individual controls vary at the individual level
nested in years and countries, indexed by itc. Macro controls only vary at the year-
country level, indexed by tc. All estimations include country fixed effects fec as well
as survey year fixed effects fet and we correct standard errors for clustering at the
country level.
We estimate different specifications of equation (2). All have individual satis-
faction with democracy as dependent variable on the left hand side but, on the
right hand side, we varied which variables we included in the vectors ‘macro’ and
‘individual’. This will be discussed in the context of the results in section 4.
SWD is a dummy derived from the question how satisfied an individual is with
the way democracy works in his or her country. It collapses answers ‘very satisfied’
and ‘fairly satisfied’ into ‘satisfied’ (SWD=1) and answers ‘not very satisfied’ and
‘not at all satisfied’ into ‘not satisfied’ (SWD=0). We use this binary recode since
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it is less susceptible to noise. In our opinion this outweighs the loss in information
on the strength of individuals’ democratic support.
Models with binary dependent variables are often estimated as nonlinear models
such as logit or probit, which explicitly take the domain restriction into account.
Instead we present results from a linear probability model, i.e. from OLS estimation
of equation 2 as is suggested by Angrist & Pischke (2009). We also estimated a
logit model and expectedly find very similar results; in case of differences we find
that our model choice goes against finding significant effects. Results from the logit
model are available in appendix B (tables B.2 and B.3).11
4. Results
An advantage of our approach over estimations based on aggregates is that we
analyse the role of both individual and national variables. Individual unemployment,
education, income, and age are likely to be relevant for SWD and are not captured
in aggregates. Neglecting individual variables therefore means neglecting potentially
important driving factors of SWD and their interaction with aggregate factors. We
also discuss whether, in addition to their personal economic situation, people also
take national performance into account when evaluating the political system.12 We
first address the impact of the macroeconomic variables (Subsection 4.1) and then
the effects of individual level variables (Subsection 4.2). We also elaborate on the
role of personal life satisfaction. Thereafter, we present estimations at the aggregate
level.
4.1. Macroeconomic Variables
We included different macroeconomic indicators successively in addition to individ-
ual characteristics to shed light on the relative importance of each of them. Since
a large literature on the relationship between democracy and economy focusses on
GDP (e.g Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Przeworski, 2000), we use GDP per head
as starting point. Our main interest, however, lies in growth, inflation, and unem-
ployment, which vary substantially over time and have been proved influential in
previous studies on SWD (Wagner et al., 2009) and right-wing extremism (Knigge,
1998; Brückner & Grüner, 2010). Furthermore, these variables are more responsive
to economic policy in the short to medium run and are more likely to be targeted
by policy makers. The following results are summarised in table A.4.
We find that economic growth is always statistically significant and so is national
unemployment. The sign of the coefficients is as expected positive in case of growth
and negative for the unemployment rate. Per capita income and inflation do not gain
significance. Without other macroeconomic controls except for per capita GDP one
11We also estimated an ordered logit model using the original 4-point scale of SWD, which confirms
the results from the binary case which we discuss in section 4. Marginal effects are strongest
for the outcome ‘fairly satisfied’. See appendix B, table B.4.
12The significance of macroeconomic variables does not necessarily imply a collectivist motive.
Macroeceonomic variables may be solely important because they affect beliefs and expectations
about individual well-being. See discussion in section 5.2.
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percentage point higher growth comes on average with a 1.3 percentage points higher
probability of satisfaction (column 2). When all three macroeconomic variables are
included, growth obtains a smaller coefficient than before but remains significant at
the 1% level (column 4).13 An increase by one percentage point in the unemployment
rate comes on average with a decrease of 1.7 percentage points in satisfaction with
democracy.
When we interpret the coefficients with respect to variation in the explanatory
variable, we find that unemployment is much more important than is growth. A
one standard deviation increase above the mean in growth rates implies an increase
in SWD of about 3 percentage points. An unemployment rate of one standard
deviation above the mean comes with a decrease of more than 7 percentage points
in SWD, more than twice as much.
When we compare our results to Halla et al. (2011), we observe important differ-
ences.14 While they also report a significant and positive effect of growth, they find
a significant effect of inflation and GDP, two variables which are insignificant in our
study. From table A.4 it is clear that the difference cannot be due to their omitting
unemployment rates. Even if we omit unemployment rates, inflation does not gain
significance. Since we use a binary recode of SWD while Halla et al. (2011) use
the four-point scale, we suspected the differences result from this modeling choice.
In section 6.2, we therefore also discuss an ordered logit estimation. The results
indicate that differences to Halla et al. (2011) do not stem from using a binary
model. In 2009, many European countries have experienced deflationary episodes.
We strongly suspect that this is driving the differences in results. While we do not
find a significantly negative effect of inflation on SWD if we include the recent years,
we do find a significant effect for the period before 2009 (see table B.5, column 2).
4.2. Individual Characteristics
At the individual level we included dummies for being unemployed and not being
part of the labour force, as well as education, sex, age, marital status.15 We expected
these variables to exhibit a similar relationship with SWD as they have with general
life satisfaction. We also controlled for personal life satisfaction. The inclusion of
individual characteristics shows that they in fact matter and are important to be
taken into account when we want to assess the implications of macroeconomic factors
on satisfaction with democracy.
13The reduction in coefficient size is intuitive as unemployment and inflation are both negatively
correlated with growth in our dataset such that the coefficient on growth is upward biased if
we omit those. Still, the significance indicates that growth had an influence on attitudes in
addition to what was captured by inflation and unemployment. One explanation is that growth
proxies for expectations of income, inflation, and employment in the future. We discuss this
hypothesis in more detail in section 6.1.
14Since we are not interested in environmental policy measures, we compare our results to the
findings without environmental policy. It seems noteworthy, though, that most variables at the
macro level become insignificant once Halla et al. (2011) include environmental policy measures.
15Income is not available for recent years and when it is available introduces a strong selection
effect. We therefore do not include it in our benchmark model but discuss reasons and conse-
quences of this decision under robustness (section 6).
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In line with the hypotheses, individual unemployment, education, and age are
significant and have the expected signs. People being unemployed showed a 4.7
percentage points lower probability of being satisfied with democracy (table A.4,
column 4). It is evident that individuals’ views on the democratic system were
affected by the national labour market as well as the individual situation at the
same time. National unemployment rates are an important factor beyond individual
unemployment and vice versa. Education was included in dummy categories. The
results indicate that those with higher education (higher education, finished school
at the age of 20 or later) and those still studying (still studying) evaluate democracy
more favorable than those with only basic or no full-time education at all (omitted
category). The influence of age is u-shaped. Older people were less satisfied with
democracy but the relationship reverses at some point in life. In contrast to the
expected negative sign, the male dummy obtained a significant, positive coefficient.
Those who were out of the labour force did not evaluate democracy significantly
differently than those who were employed. Marital status did not reach significance
either.
As expected, life satisfaction is strongly positively correlated with SWD. Being
not at all satisfied with one’s life translated into a probability of not being satisfied
with democracy that is 33 percentage points higher than for a person who was
fairly satisfied with her life. Those who stated to be ‘not very satisfied’ with their
life in general were still less likely to be satisfied with democracy (-25 percentage
points) and those who were very satisfied with their life had a 7.5 percentage point
higher probability to also express satisfaction with the way democracy works. This
indicates a close link between the perceived personal situation and the view on the
democratic system.
Life satisfaction as well as SWD are subjective measures and we are aware of
concerns regarding the use of subjective variables as dependent and explanatory at
the same time (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001). However, many studies indicate
that macroeconomic variables also affect individual life satisfaction and happiness
(see e.g. Di Tella et al. (2001, 2003); Deaton (2008); Dreher & Öhler (2011)) and
ignoring this will likely introduce a bias into the results, in particular since life
satisfaction is also known to be correlated with many of our individual level controls
(see for instance Frey & Stutzer (2002b)).
In our case, the inclusion of life satisfaction hardly affects the coefficients of macro
variables. In case of changes, omitting life satisfaction overstates the importance of
the macroeconomy. Specifically, comparing columns 1 and 6 in table A.4, it is clear
that quantitative findings from the specification with life satisfaction are more con-
servative than they are without it. The coefficients of unemployment and age become
larger when life satisfaction is omitted and the coefficient of married becomes signif-
icantly positive. Furthermore, the effects of education appear stronger. The results
imply that the effects of unemployment, age, marital status, and education are over-
estimated when life satisfaction is not included. The coefficients of macroeconomic
variables change very little; growth and unemployment slightly increase when life
satisfaction is not included. Also note that the changes in coefficients are not due to
a selection effect. In column 5 we show results from the estimation model without
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life satisfaction on the sample where the variable is available. There is hardly any
difference between column 1 (full sample) and column 5 (restricted sample).
With respect to individual characteristics our results are very similar to Halla et al.
(2011), qualitatively. The signs of all coefficients are the same with one exception:
In contrast to Halla et al. (2011) we do not find a significantly positive effect of being
married on SWD. In section 6.2 we show that this difference is most likely due to
the omission of life satisfaction in their study. Life satisfaction should be included
in analyses of SWD since it is likely to provide a lower bound on the role of other
factors.
4.3. Aggregate Level Regressions
Analyses at the country level cannot inform about how individual satisfaction scores
are formed but have to collapse either the ordered data to an average or a binary
recode to a percentage measure of support. Changes in these national averages can
come by various channels and are less likely to be informative than an analysis with
data at the individual level. In this section, we report results from estimations where
we ignored the individual dimension of our data set and checked whether there is a
relationship between satisfaction with democracy and macroeconomic conditions at
the aggregate country level. These results can then also be compared with previous
studies on SWD that used country averages over time as observations. We used
the year-wise country averages of the SWD dummy as dependent variable, which
represents the percentage of people who are satisfied with democracy in a given year
in a country.16
Comparing aggregate estimations (Table A.5) with our individual-level approach
(Table A.4), it becomes evident that coefficients have the same sign and a similar
size. In the aggregate estimations growth obtains a slightly smaller coefficient: With
the full set of macroeconomic controls the aggregate specification gives a coefficient of
0.0076 instead of 0.0105 with individual level data. The coefficient on unemployment
is slightly larger (in absolute terms) in the aggregate (-0.0190) than at the individual
level (-0.0172). In contrast to our results using individual level data, at the aggregate
level inflation is (weakly) significant.
Our results at the aggregate level are broadly consistent with studies by other au-
thors. Growth is significantly positive, unemployment and inflation are significantly
negative (compare for instance Wagner et al., 2009; Clarke et al., 1993). Looking at
columns (2) to (3), a one percentage point increase in growth is associated with an
increase in the share of the population stating that they are satisfied with democ-
racy of about 1.2 percentage point. In the full specification (column 4), however, the
coefficient of growth decreases. Most likely the upward differential in the coefficient
of growth (columns 3 to 4) comes from higher growth capturing also the impact of
reduced unemployment on democratic satisfaction.17 An increase in national unem-
16When we use average satisfaction scores instead of the average over SWD-dummies as dependent
variable, results are qualitatively the same. Results are presented in table B.6.
17If unemployment rates change mainly because of changes in economic growth, then it is even
informative to look at regressions with growth only.
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ployment of 1 percentage point decreased satisfaction with democracy by almost 2
percentage points on average.
5. Discussion
5.1. Economic relevance: satisfaction scores during the Great
Recession
Our results suggest that, on average, satisfaction with democracy should have de-
creased by non-negligible numbers in the context of the Great Recession. We have
estimated our model on pre-2007 data and compute predicted changes in satisfac-
tion with democracy due to worsening economic conditions. Using data until 2006
growth and unemployment are significant with coefficients of 0.0089 and -0.0167,
respectively. Individual unemployment is significant with -0.0444.18 Based on these
coefficients we expect that individuals experiencing developments of growth and
unemployment rates as were observed in Ireland, Spain, and Greece from 2006 to
2010 exhibited a decrease in SWD by about 21 (Ireland), 24 (Spain)and 14 (Greece)
percentage points.19 In fact, for these countries, we observe a substantial decrease
of average SWD by about 20 percentage points as compared to the situation before
the Great Recession. In Ireland, satisfaction with democracy fell from 0.78 in 2006
to 0.58 in 2010 according to Eurobarometer data; in Spain in the same period from
0.74 to 0.53, in Greece from 0.54 to 0.30.20
The above calculation is a rough estimate but matches surprisingly well with
actual developments. There are important caveats in that, in our prediction, we
only consider macroeconomic variables and the coefficients are based on annual
data. The economic downturn, however, stretches over more than one period and
if macroeconomic conditions are poor over longer horizons, the picture may change.
It is possible that people adapt to worsening economic conditions such that their
satisfaction is on average affected less than if there is only a short downturn. It
is, however, also imaginable that individuals become increasingly dissatisfied if the
macroeconomy fails to recover for several years. Our approach cannot speak to these
hypotheses.
Some tentative implication for economic policies can be drawn from our results.
Economic policies that result in good economic performance can increase peoples’
political support directly via national economic performance and indirectly when
the effects materialise at the individual level. Importantly, however, our results also
reveal the limitations of these policies. Crucial for political support is personal life
18We restricted our sample to the years 1973-2006 and estimated our baseline specification (see
table A.4 column 4 for full sample results). Demographic controls obtain very similar to the
full estimation discussed before. Results for this estimation are provided in table B.5.
19Changes in real growth rates between 2006 and 2010 were -5.7 percentage points for Ireland and
-4.2 for Spain. Greece experienced a decrease in its growth rate of 9 percentage points in 2010
(Eurostat, 2011a). Unemployment rates increased by 9.2 percentage points in Ireland, by 11.6
in Spain, and by 3.7 in Greece between 2006 and 2010 (Eurostat, 2011b).
20Our prediction for Portugal is much lower with an expected decrease in SWD by 5.86 percentage
points. This compares well with the actually experienced drop in SWD by 4 percentage points
from 0.31 to 0.27.
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satisfaction which cannot be easily addressed by economic policy and might not be
an appropriate political target either.
5.2. Channels of influence: micro or macro? selfish citizens
or collectivist concerns?
In principle, microlevel data allows us to assess how important are correlates of
SWD at the micro level relative to those at the national level. Unemployment man-
ifests itself directly at the individual level. A change in the national unemployment
rate leads to a change in employment status for some citizens. At the individ-
ual level, being unemployed is associated with a 4.7 percentage point decrease in
satisfaction with democracy. To have the same effect the national unemployment
rate would have to increase by 2.7 percentage points. At the aggregate level the
picture is different though. To assess the effect of an increase in unemployment
at the national level, we aggregate the individual effects of being unemployed on
SWD for those who become unemployed and compare it with the direct effect of
the change in the unemployment rate on SWD. We find that the effect running
through individual unemployment is an order of magnitude smaller than the effect
of the unemployment rate: Suppose unemployment increases by 1 percentage point.
Then, the direct effect is −0.0172. The indirect effect from individuals becoming
unemployed is 0.01 · (−0.047) = −0.00047 and the total effect is the sum of the
two, i.e. −0.01767.21 However, this comparison of individual versus national level
determinants takes into account only one period. Taking a longer-term perspec-
tive the effect of individual unemployment is larger: since unemployed individuals
are less satisfied with democracy than their employed peers, a change in national
unemployment implies a persistent level effect in SWD. Even when unemployment
rates do not worsen in subsequent periods, as long as unemployment isn’t cut back
again, those who became unemployed remain less satisfied and imply on average
lower SWD in every period after.
This comparison does not tell why national level variables seem to be relevant
for individuals’ satisfaction with democracy. National unemployment rates can be
influential due to pure self-interest since it is for instance indicative of the risk
of getting unemployed, of wage developments, or upcoming job opportunities. A
similar argument holds for growth rates: their being significant does not imply
that individuals care about the performance of their country as a greater good. It
can simply mean that they value growth as an indicator of higher transfers, better
public services or lower taxes, factors which all materialise at the individual level
and highlight the self-interest dimension of national performance. We show that the
effects we find are unlikely to be driven by narrow self-interest alone by looking at
subgroups of the population. We analyse separately the population with only basic
or no education at all and elderly people (table A.6), as well as the unemployed and
those who are not part of the labour force (table A.7).
The first interesting finding is that the effects of growth and unemployment rates
are very stable across the subgroups we analyse. A second interesting finding is
the heterogeneity in the effect of inflation on SWD which we discuss in the next
21We take the estimated coefficients from table A.4, column 4.
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subsection. National unemployment rates are significant for all subgroups and are
not significantly different in size. This means that unemployment rates are not
more important for the less-skilled even though they have arguably a higher risk
of becoming unemployed. Unemployment rates are relevant no matter whether an
individual is still in work or already unemployed, and they are significantly correlated
with SWD for those in as well as those out of the labour force. Most interestingly,
unemployment rates are highly significant also for those aged 60 or above, who to
a large degree will not be directly affected since they do not actively participate in
the labour market anymore and will never reenter. A potential explanation is that
these individuals often have children who are in working age and therefore they care
more. Unfortunately, we cannot test this hypothesis. The Eurobarometer does not
contain information on parenthood but only lists the number of children aged under
15.22
Our findings that unemployment plays an important role independent of being
directly affected are similar to the results by Falk et al. (2011) in the context of
right-wing extremist crimes. They analyze the effect of regional unemployment
rates on right-wing extremist crimes in German states. While the unemployment
rate has a positive and statistically significant effect on right-wing extremist crimes,
the youth unemployment rate does not have a statistically significant influence. So,
given that most right-wing extremist crimes are comitted by youg men, as in our
analysis other factors than personal experience of unemployment seem to explain
the overall effect of the unemployment rate.
We cannot conclude that individuals care about the performance of their country
per se, e.g., for collective welfare reasons. Still, the effects are unlikely to be driven
by pure self-interest. Low-skilled versus high-skilled, unemployed versus employed,
and elderly versus younger people are very differently exposed to labour market
conditions such that we expect heterogeneous effects according to the self-interest
model. Not finding such differences implies other factors are at work.
One explanation for our findings are collectivist welfare concerns. Individuals
may have a ‘true preference’ for democracy because it is believed to be the system
that is best able to provide collective welfare. Growth and low unemployment are
success indicators of this systems performance and can make individuals be satisfied
with democracy even when it does not directly maximise their expected personal
income since their true preference implies a concern for collective welfare (see Sen
(1977) for a similar argument). Another explanation is that individuals take general
equilibrium effects and their consequences at the individual level into account. For
instance they anticipate cuts in transfers or increases in taxes when the economic
situation is worsening.
22We included this information on children and find no effect. Elderly people living together
with children under 15 years do not react to unemployment rates any differently than elderly
people not living together with children. Neither do individuals with children according to this
definition react any differently than those without children.
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5.3. Heterogeneous effects and the trade-off between
unemployment and inflation
An enduring economic policy debate concerns a possible trade-off between inflation
and unemployment which societies may face. Assuming such a relationship, we
would like to know which is the trade-off between inflation and unemployment in
terms of satisfaction with democracy. In this section, we use our estimation results
to analyse the relative costs of inflation and unemployment in terms of changes in
SWD. In the full sample, however, inflation rates never gained significance preventing
this type of analysis.23 We therefore analyse subgroups separately and find that in
contrast to growth and unemployment, inflation exhibits heterogeneous effects. In
terms of satisfaction scores, a trade-off between inflation and unemployment exists,
but it is a different trade-off for different parts of the population.
High inflation rates exhibit a significantly negative effect on the higher skilled
individuals, those younger than 60 years, and those in the labour force. In the
analysis using the full sample, this was blurred by inflation not affecting low skilled
individuals, the elderly and those out of labour force. Inflation does not gain sig-
nificance in the full sample (columns (1) and (6) in table A.6) and neither does it
in the subsample of low skilled (column (2) in table A.6), in the subsample of the
elderly (column (7) in table A.6), in the subsample of unemployed (column (2) in
table A.7), or in the subsample of those out of the labor force (column (7) in table
A.7). When we include an interaction term between the subgroup and inflation, we
however obtain a negatively significant effect of inflation and a positively significant
interaction term (Table A.6, column (5) with respect to education, column (10) with
respect to age and table A.7 column (10) with respect to not being part of the labor
force).
Inflation does not seem to affect employed and unemployed individuals differently
when we look at column (5) in table A.7. However, the control group here is all
individuals who are not unemployed, including those who are not part of the labour
force. When we include an additional interaction term to allow for a differential
effect of inflation on those out of the labour force, we find that the interaction with
inflation is highly significant for both subgroups, the unemployed and those out of
the labour force (table A.7, column 6). Inflation is found to be negatively associated
with satisfaction with democracy only for those actively participate in the labour
market and have a job.
We now reexamine the inflation-unemployment trade-off accounting for the het-
erogeneity in effects. On average younger Europeans experience the same loss in
satisfaction with democracy for a 1% point increase in unemployment rates and
23If we look at the subsample where information on income is available, inflation is significant.
From table A.4, column 7 we read that the loss in satisfaction with democracy from a 1
percentage point increase in unemployment equals the effect from an increase in f(inflation)
by 0.537 percentage point (the sum of the direct and indirect effect of inflation divided by the
effect of unemployment: −0.0170− 0.01 · 0.0399)/(−0.0324) = 0.537).
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an increase by 0.77 in f(inflation)24.25 The elderly are much more concerned with
unemployment. Under the assumption of a linear effect, inflation being insignifi-
cant would imply that elderly preferred an arbitrarily large increase in inflation to
prevent unemployment from rising. If the effect we find for the elderly was signifi-
cant, the same decrease in satisfaction would be computed for an increase by 8.36
in f(inflation) as compared to a 1% point increase in unemployment.26 A similar
picture obtains when we split the population into those with low and high education.
For individuals with higher education, an increase by 0.6 in f(inflation) is associated
with the same satisfaction cost as a 1% point increase in unemployment.27 For those
with low education, inflation is insignificant.28
The derived numbers can be interpreted as marginal rates of substitution be-
tween f(inflation) and unemployment. Our results indicate a very low importance
of inflation in the aggregate when we look at satisfaction with democracy. This is
in contrast to Di Tella et al. (2003) who analyse life satisfaction scores and find
that the marginal rate of substitution between inflation and unemployment is 1.66.
Aggregate numbers hide however, that there is an important heterogeneity across
subgroups of the population (not addressed in Di Tella et al. (2003)). Not everybody
agrees on unemployment being more costly than inflation. For instance the higher
educated and the younger, seem to accept relatively higher unemployment rates and
desire lower inflation, as compared to the less educated and elderly, respectively.
6. Robustness
In this section we address important issues to demonstrate the robustness of our
findings. First, we investigate the importance of lagged macro variables for our
results and possible reverse causality issues. In this context we also discuss the
possible role of (growth) expectations. Second, we present results from alternative
specifications such as logit and ordered logit as well as a model where we control
for income. Lastly, we argue why not controlling for institutional quality is without
loss of generality.
24Since we use a transformation of inflation we cannot compute the trade-off in terms of percentage
points. For low inflation rates f(inflation) is linear (up to 1) or almost linear. A 1% point
increase in unemployment rates is associated with the same loss in SWD as a 0.77% point
increase in inflation when inflation is low.
25From table A.6, column 10 we obtain 0.77 = (−0.0171 + 0.01 · (−0.0456))/(−0.0228).
268.36 = (−0.0171 + 0.01 · (−0.0456))/(−0.0228 + 0.0207). With an average share of people aged
sixty and above of 21.89% the aggregate effect would then be 0.2189 · 8.36 + (1 − 0.2189) ·
.77 = 2.43. Due to the logarithmic transformation of inflation this relates to an extremely
high tolerance (about the tenfold) for inflation as compared to unemployment rates. This is
consistent with the insignificance of inflation in the full sample.
27From table A.6, column (5) we obtain 0.60 = (−0.0172 + 0.01 · (−0.0465))/(−0.0296).
28If the effect was significant at the size we find, an increase by 5.2 in inflation would be associated
with the same satisfaction cost as a 1% point increase in unemployment since from table A.6,
column (5) 5.20 = (−0.0172 + 0.01 · (−0.0465))/(−0.0296 + 0.0262). With an average share of
people with low education of 38.27% the aggregate effect would be 0.3827 · 5.20+ (1− 0.3827) ·
0.60 = 2.36.
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6.1. Lagged Growth, Growth Expectations and Endogeneity
Growth rates from previous periods may be influential in addition to contempora-
neous rates because real effects need time to materialise. Thus, we tested whether
lagged growth rates have an impact on SWD. Column 1 in table A.8 is our bench-
mark model which we have discussed before (section 4 and table A.4, column 4).
Column 2 shows that lagged growth does not have a significant influence on SWD
and including it in the regression hardly affects the coefficients of the other macroe-
conomic variables. Growth and unemployment rates remain significant, inflation
is still insignificant. The result is intuitive as the development of unemployment
rates as well as inflation is at least partly determined by economic development and
thus lagging behind. If we omit lagged growth and it has a positive influence on
employment today and a positive influence on satisfaction, then the coefficient on
unemployment is downward biased because unemployment has a negative effect on
satisfaction. The argument for inflation is analogous. Coefficients on individual
controls are almost unaffected. As lagged growth rates did not gain significance, we
did not include them in any other regression.
An important objection to the results presented in section 4 and table A.4 is
that not growth has an influence on SWD but instead higher satisfaction levels lead
to better economic performance. We undertake a robustness check regarding this
endogeneity issue and conclude that our results are not a pure artefact of endogenous
growth rates.
First, we included future growth rates (column 3 of table A.8). Future growth
obtains a coefficient even larger in size than the coefficient of contemporaneous
growth. This might be due to reverse causality, i.e. satisfaction with democracy
driving growth rates, but could also be caused by serial correlation of growth rates.
In both cases, however, this is not the entire story since contemporaneous growth
and unemployment remain significant, in line with our hypothesis that growth has
an effect on SWD. The effect which remains when we include future growth can be
considered a lower bound on the effect of growth on SWD. A third explanation for
why future growth is significant is that it proxies for growth expectations. Growth
expectations in turn are likely to have a positive effect on satisfaction scores. These
expectations may be influenced by growth forecasts and media reports. In this case,
the coefficient on future growth should not be ignored and the full effect of growth
on SWD, summing over contemporaneous and future growth it is 1.82 percentage
points, is even larger than the previously estimated 1.21 percentage points. Since
our data does not allow to control for expectations, we cannot distinguish these
hypotheses.
Second, we also included the average lagged satisfaction with democracy at the
country level average of SWD (column 4). By doing so, we control for the link
potentially running from SWD to growth in the next period. Furthermore, the co-
efficient on future growth rates controls for correlation between SWD today and
growth tomorrow. Thus, the coefficient of growth in column 4 reflects only con-
temporaneous correlation between SWD and growth. This is more likely to be an
effect from growth on SWD than an effect from contemporaneous SWD on contem-
poraneous growth. Since satisfaction with democracy on average does not change
very fast, this absorbs a large part of the variation and might make inference less
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reliable. The effect of growth is still about 40% as large as in the main analysis and
marginally significant.
6.2. Alternative specifications
In the following, we show that our results are robust to several alternative specifi-
cations. We begin with discussing the relevance of personal income and accounting
for time trends. Furthermore, we check for the relevance of recoding our dependent
variable and of using a linear model. Satisfaction with democracy is originally avail-
able at a scale with four categories which we chose to recode as a binary measure
of democratic satisfaction. In all regressions so far we employed a linear probability
model. In this section, we compare our results to (i) a logit model and (ii) an ordered
logit model which makes use of the four categories of SWD.
6.2.1. Income
Income was not asked in every year and not at all in the years after 2004 such that
a substantial number of income observations is missing. Since we are particularly
interested in including the recent recessionary years and to avoid a selection effect, we
do not control for income in our main analysis. Our robustness check indicates that
income does not affect our results beyond a selection effect driven by the availability
of the income measure. We are therefore confident that our result would be robust to
the inclusion of income if it was fully available. Income is only recorded in country-
specific classes. To obtain a comparable measure across countries, we computed
country-specific income deciles and categorised individuals in three groups ‘rich’,
‘middle income’, and ‘poor’ according to their decile and chose ‘middle income’ is
the omitted category.29
We illustrate in table A.4, columns 7 that the effects of inflation and growth
are indeed different in the subsample for which income information is available.
As compared to the benchmark in column 4, the coefficient of growth decreases
substantially to .006 and inflation becomes marginally significant. The coefficient
on individual unemployment becomes smaller, and neither sex nor education are
significant anymore. Column 8 in the same table shows that beyond this selection
effect the inclusion of income seems to have little effect on the results. We do find
a small effect of income though. Rich people have a slightly increased probability
to be satisfied with democracy compared to middle income earners. There is no
significant effect for individuals with low income.
6.2.2. Time trends
Sometimes it is argued that analyses as the one we undertake should include a time
trend to avoid spurious regression results due to underlying trends in the variables.
To address this issue, we estimated a model including country specific time trends.
We find that our specification without time trends leads to more conservative results
with respect to growth. However, regarding unemployment rates, the inclusion of
29Details on the variable definition can be found in table A.1.
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a country-specific time trend leads to marginally lower coefficients (the coefficient
goes down from .0172 to .0155). The absolute size of the effect of unemployment
rates on SWD should therefore be taken with caution. For details see table B.7.
6.2.3. Logit
Above we only describe results from ordinary least squares regressions (linear prob-
ability model) although our dependent variable is binary. In our opinion the advan-
tages in terms of interpretation and simplicity of the linear model outweigh potential
gains from the nonlinear model (for a discussion see also Angrist & Pischke (2009)).
However, we also estimated a logit model which explicitly restricts the outcome
variables to lie between zero and one. Results are qualitatively the same and quan-
titatively close to those from the OLS. All marginal effects lie above the coefficients
estimated by OLS and therefore our model choice gives rather conservative results.
For details see tables B.2 and B.3.
6.2.4. Ordered Logit
While we believe that the analysis is more rigorous when a binary recode is used,
we also analysed determinants of SWD using the orignal, ordered outcome. This
exercise provides little additional insight. All variables which obtained significance
in the binary model are significant in the ordered logit and go in the same direction
but, in addition, inflation becomes significant. Higher inflation rates were associated
with lower probabilities of being very or fairly satisfied and higher probabilities of
being not very or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works. When we sum
the marginal effects for the two lower categories, we obtain a value by and large
comparable in size to the sum of the marginal effects for the two upper categories
but with opposite signs.30 This is consistent with the view that the results in the
binary recode are driven by individuals switching from being not satisfied to being
satisfied with the way democracy works. It indicates that the binary recode does
not come with a substantial loss of information. For details see table B.4.
We have shown before that inflation is insignificant in the binary model with and
without unemployment rates (see section 4.1, table A.4). When we estimate an
ordered logit model with and without national unemployment rates, we find that
inflation is significant only when we include unemployment as well. This contrasts
with Halla et al. (2011) who omit unemployment rates but find inflation to be
significant. Since they include further macro variables, this might be driven by
those.31 We conclude that the decision which macro variables to include plays an
important role for the results. We argue in the following subsection 6.3 that our
results do not seem to be affected by the omission of policy variables similar to those
included in Halla et al. (2011). We therefore consider our results more robust.
30The lower categories are answers ‘not at all satisfied’ and ‘not very satisfied’, the upper categories
are the answers ‘fairly satisfied’ and ‘very satisfied’ with the way democracy works.
31While they control for GDP and population and find both significant with opposite signs, we
find that GDP per head never gains significance. This is consistent with each other and we
therefore do not discuss it further.
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6.3. Institutional quality and policy measures
Our analysis assumes that democratic institutions in Western Europe did not change
over the relevant time horizon and we do not include a control for institutional qual-
ity. We argue that this is not a restriction for several reasons. First, the binary
Democracy-Dictatorhsip measure as discussed in Cheibub et al. (2009) is constant
at 1 for all country-year pairs in our sample, indicating stable democracies. Conse-
quently, our results would remain the same if we controlled for institutional quality in
this sense. Second, our results are robust to the use of alternative indicators of insti-
tutional quality, the Polity IV index (Marshall et al., 2011) and the Freedom House
index (Freedom House, 2011). Both have often been used but are also criticised
(see for instance Cheibub et al. (2009)). Controlling for either of the two indicators
does not affect our findings and the indicators remain insignificant as shown in table
B.8. The freedom house index is only available until 2008. Omitting the years 2009
and 2010 from the analysis does affect the results, in particular inflation becomes
significant. The effect comes only from the sample restriction, though, and is not
related to institutional quality. We do not include elective fractionalization, which
is also sometimes included in analyses like ours, since it never gained significance
in a very related analysis of SWD by Halla et al. (2011). Third, in an analysis of
political preferences in Central and Eastern European countries Grosjean & Senik
(2011) find no significant effect of market liberalisation on support for democracy.
This supports our view that even though there have been major changes for example
in the organisation of the European common market these changes are not of major
concern.
Another possible objection to our analysis is that it is not the macroeconomic
outcomes that influence citizens’ satisfaction but instead policies implemented by
governments. We therefore test for the effects of debt and deficit levels and also
include two measures which proxy for social spending, (1) the population aged 65
and above as a percentage of total population and (2) social security transfers as
a percentage of GDP. All four variables are taken from Armingeon et al. (2009).
Unfortunately, we have information on deficits and debt levels only until 2007, and
information on social transfers only until 2000 such that we cannot compare the
results with policy variables directly to those from the main analysis.32 To be
able to assess the relevance of policy measures, we estimate the main model on
the subsample for which all policy variables are available and than included the
policy measures. The restriction to the subsample changes results substantially,
in particular inflation becomes significant due to the omission of recent years with
relatively low inflation rates. However, the inclusion of policy measures does not
lead to additional changes. In contrast to Halla et al. (2011), none of the policy
variables gains significance. Results are provided in table B.9.
32Moreover, these variables are missing for Luxembourg, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, Norway, and
Austria in some years earlier than 2001. These drawbacks are the reasons why we only present
this as a robustness exercise and exclude it from the main analysis.
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7. Conclusion
The European debt crisis has had a severe impact on European democracies. In the
five most heavily affected EU member countries, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
and Spain governments have been voted out office. More than that, demands by the
various protestors go beyond the deselection of governments. People’s perception of
the democratic system have changed in the course of the crisis, not only in Greece
but also in many other European countries.
This paper shows that the changing attitudes towards democracy were to be
expected as a consequence of extremely poor national economic performance, also
called the Great Recession. Lower growth rates and higher unemployment rates
were both associated with fewer respondents stating they were satisfied with the
way democracy works. For drops in growth rates and rise in unemployment rates as
experienced for example by Spain or Ireland, our simple annual estimate of a drop in
satisfaction with democracy by 19 to 24 percentage points is close to actual changes
in satisfaction with democracy which were around -20 percentage points. Moreover,
our analysis shows that the unemployment rate is substantially more important
than the inflation rate in shaping attitudes towards the democratic system and also
more important than the growth rate. From that perspective any policy intended
to improve peoples’ satisfaction with the democratic system should prioritize job
creation.
While not contradicting previous work, our analysis uncovered important new as-
pects. First, growth and unemployment rates were found simultaneously significant
while, in contrast to previous research, inflation is insignificant. This difference is
driven by including the years 2009 and 2010.33 Moreover, while inflation is not sig-
nificant for the period we consider for the entire population, it has a significantly
negative effect on individuals who are higher skilled, younger than 60, or have a job.
Second, our results show that individual variables, in particular individual unem-
ployment, education and age, are an important driver of satisfaction with democracy.
Moreover, perceived life satisfaction has a strong effect and its inclusion increased
explanatory power substantially (with respect to R2). This last result is a challenge
for policy-makers and future research because it is not obvious whether economic
policy should indeed target individuals’ life satisfaction and if it should how it can
do so.
Finally, while individual controls are important, they do not make macroeconomic
variables irrelevant. National aggregates like unemployment and growth have a
significant effect beyond what materialises at the individual level. It is beyond
the scope of this paper to provide a clear-cut answer why national indicators are
significant. However, our analysis suggests that a collectivist perspective plays a
role. If peoples’ evaluation of democracy was driven by pure self-interest, we would
expect a differential effect of growth and unemployment across subgroups of the
population (for instance skilled versus unskilled). The lack thereof suggests that
collectivist concerns for national economic performance play a role.
33These years were markedly different: some countries went through a phase of very low inflation
rates and some countries even experienced a period of deflation. When we restricted our sample
to the period before 2008, the significance of inflation was restored.
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Figure 1: Percentage of individuals satisfied with democracy over time (weighted)
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Table A.4: Impact of macroeconomic and individual level variables on SWD (individual data)
dependent:
SWD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
macroeconomic variables
GDP per
head
0.0066 0.0054 0.0056 0.0010 0.0011 0.0010 0.0045 0.0045
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
growth 0.0131*** 0.0131*** 0.0105*** 0.0116*** 0.0106*** 0.0060* 0.0060*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
f(inflation) -0.0054 -0.0188 -0.0200 -0.0218 -0.0324* -0.0326*
(0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.019)
UE rate -0.0172*** -0.0187*** -0.0194*** -0.0170*** -0.0171***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
individual variables
unemployed -0.0512*** -0.0509*** -0.0511*** -0.0470*** -0.1122*** -0.1086*** -0.0399*** -0.0352***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
out of LF -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0020 -0.0015 -0.0053 -0.0042 -0.0013 0.0019
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
married -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0266*** 0.0257*** -0.0002 -0.0039
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
male 0.0069* 0.0068* 0.0068* 0.0067* 0.0031 0.0033 0.0061 0.0061
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
age -0.0023*** -0.0023*** -0.0023*** -0.0025*** -0.0052*** -0.0049*** -0.0025*** -0.0026***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
age2 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
intermediate
education
0.0092 0.0095 0.0095 0.0089 0.0219** 0.0222*** 0.0073 0.0042
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
higher edu-
cation
0.0273* 0.0278* 0.0278* 0.0266* 0.0511*** 0.0512*** 0.0161 0.0098
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015)
still study-
ing
0.0288* 0.0296* 0.0295* 0.0282* 0.0597*** 0.0602*** 0.0156 0.0093
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015)
not at all
satisfied
-0.3419*** -0.3402*** -0.3401*** -0.3371*** -0.3536*** -0.3511***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.028) (0.029)
not very sat-
isfied
-0.2484*** -0.2479*** -0.2479*** -0.2456*** -0.2645*** -0.2626***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020)
very satis-
fied
0.0753*** 0.0750*** 0.0751*** 0.0745*** 0.0805*** 0.0791***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
poor -0.0097
(0.006)
rich 0.0142**
(0.005)
survey FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
nation FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 606504 606504 606504 602545 602545 660546 353132 353132
R2 0.1373 0.1388 0.1388 0.1433 0.0961 0.0968 0.1501 0.1504
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable is a dummy.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at nation level.
(4) is the reference for robustness checks. In (5) we restrict attention to the subsample were life satisfaction is available
but do not include it. In (6) we exclude life satisfaction from the estimation. (7) is estimated on the reduced sample where
income is available, (8) controls for income groups.
The chosen order of inclusion of macroeconomic variables is irrelevant for our results (see table B.1).
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Table A.5: Impact of macroeconomic variables on per-
centage SWD (country panel)
dependent: SWD (1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP per head 0.0044*** 0.0034** 0.0031** 0.0017
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
growth 0.0118*** 0.0121*** 0.0076***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
f(inflation) 0.0013 -0.0030*
(0.002) (0.002)
UE rate -0.0190***
(0.002)
survey FE yes yes yes yes
country FE yes yes yes yes
N 483 483 482 476
R2 0.7421 0.7537 0.7540 0.8101
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable is the average of the SWD dummy in a given coun-
try.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at nation level.
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Table A.8: Lagged growth and endogeneity
dependent: SWD (1) (2) (3) (4)
macroeconomic variables
GDP per head 0.0010 0.0008 0.0018 0.0004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
growtht 0.0105*** 0.0095*** 0.0057** 0.0040*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
growtht−1 0.0028
(0.002)
growtht+1 0.0102*** 0.0062***
(0.002) (0.002)
f(inflation)t -0.0188 -0.0195 -0.0216* -0.0139
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
SWDt−1 0.5549***
(0.063)
ind. controls yes yes yes yes
survey FE yes yes yes yes
country FE yes yes yes yes
N 602545 602545 592075 546239
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable is a dummy.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at nation level.
(1) is the reference estimation from table A.4, column (4).
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B. Additional tables
Table B.1: Order of inclusion of macro variables does not matter
dependent:
SWD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
macroeconomic variables
GDP per head 0.0054 0.0068 0.0013 0.0056 0.0006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
growth 0.0141*** 0.0131*** 0.0131*** 0.0106*** 0.0106***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
f(inflation) 0.0001 -0.0049 -0.0054 -0.0184
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.012)
UE rate -0.0175*** -0.0171*** -0.0162*** -0.0175***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ind.
controls
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
survey
FE
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
nation
FE
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 607486 607486 602545 606504 606504 602545 606504 602545 602545
R2 0.1382 0.1364 0.142 0.1388 0.1373 0.1421 0.1388 0.143 0.1433
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable is a dummy.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at nation level.
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Table B.2: Impact of macroeconomic and individual level variables on SWD (individual data)
- Logit
dependent:
SWD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
macroeconomic variables
GDP per
head
0.0092* 0.0076 0.0078 0.0014 0.0014 0.0016 0.0057 0.0057
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
growth 0.0145*** 0.0145*** 0.0121*** 0.0116*** 0.0126*** 0.0069* 0.0069*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
f(inflation) -0.0056 -0.0214 -0.0235 -0.0214 -0.0384 -0.0385
(0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.024) (0.024)
UE rate -0.0199*** -0.0215*** -0.0208*** -0.0197*** -0.0198***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
individual variables
unemployed -0.0589*** -0.0587*** -0.0589*** -0.0551*** -0.1178*** -0.1216*** -0.0476*** -0.0420***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
out of LF -0.0020 -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0018 -0.0046 -0.0057 -0.0017 0.0020
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
married 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0011 0.0286*** 0.0295*** -0.0003 -0.0047
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
male 0.0081* 0.0080* 0.0080* 0.0080* 0.0038 0.0036 0.0074 0.0074
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
age -0.0027*** -0.0027*** -0.0027*** -0.0028*** -0.0054*** -0.0057*** -0.0029*** -0.0030***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
age2 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
intermediate
education
0.0104 0.0107 0.0107 0.0100 0.0233*** 0.0235*** -0.0188 -0.0113
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.020) (0.018)
higher edu-
cation
0.0312* 0.0317* 0.0317* 0.0306* 0.0557*** 0.0556*** -0.0104 -0.0067
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
still study-
ing
0.0331** 0.0339** 0.0338** 0.0327** 0.0649*** 0.0652*** -0.0005 -0.0004
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.007) (0.007)
not at all
satisfied
-0.3680*** -0.3669*** -0.3669*** -0.3652*** -0.3823*** -0.3802***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
not very sat-
isfied
-0.2650*** -0.2649*** -0.2649*** -0.2637*** -0.2868*** -0.2849***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
very satis-
fied
0.0855*** 0.0854*** 0.0854*** 0.0853*** 0.0911*** 0.0896***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
poor -0.0116*
(0.007)
rich 0.0166***
(0.006)
survey FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
nation FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 606504 606504 606504 602545 660546 602545 353132 353132
Pseudo R2 0.1057 0.1069 0.1069 0.1106 0.0737 0.0732 0.1159 0.1161
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable is a dummy.
Marginal effects. When independent variable is a dummy, discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at nation level.
(4) is the reference for robustness checks. In (5) we restrict attention to the subsample were life satisfaction is available
but do not include it. In (6) we exclude life satisfaction from the estimation. (7) is estimated on the reduced sample where
income is available, (8) controls for income groups.
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Table B.3: Lagged growth and endogeneity - Logit
dependent: SWD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
macroeconomic variables
GDP per head 0.0014 0.0011 0.0026 0.0023 0.0009 0.0010
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
growtht 0.0121*** 0.0110*** 0.0064** 0.0053* 0.0046* 0.0048**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
growtht−1 0.0030 0.0029 -0.0006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
growtht+1 0.0118*** 0.0116*** 0.0068*** 0.0068***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
f(inflation) -0.0214 -0.0221 -0.0249* -0.0255* -0.0163 -0.0162
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
UE rate -0.0199*** -0.0195*** -0.0201*** -0.0197*** -0.0068*** -0.0068***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
SWDc,t−1 0.6426*** 0.6436***
(0.069) (0.069)
ind. controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
survey FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 602545 602545 592075 592075 546239 546239
Pseudo R2 0.1106 0.1106 0.1111 0.1111 0.1158 0.1158
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable is a dummy.
Marginal effects. When independent variable is a dummy, discrete change of dummy variable from
0 to 1.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at nation level.
(1) is the reference estimation from table B.2, column (4).
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Table B.5: Sample restrictions: (1)
1973-2006, (2) 1973-
2008
dependent: SWD (1) (2)
macroeconomic variables
GDP per head 0.0029 0.0023
(0.003) (0.003)
growth 0.0089** 0.0091**
(0.004) (0.004)
f(inflation) -0.0322* -0.0313*
(0.017) (0.017)
UE rate -0.0167*** -0.0169***
(0.002) (0.002)
ind. controls yes yes
survey FE yes yes
nation FE yes yes
N 561582 576656
R2 0.1438 0.01442
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable is a dummy.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering
at nation level.
Table B.6: Impact of macroeconomic variables on av-
erage SWD scores (country panel)
dependent: SWD (1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP per head 0.0060** 0.0042* 0.0043* 0.0021
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
growth 0.0214*** 0.0215*** 0.0136***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
f(inflation) -0.0001 -0.0076***
(0.003) (0.003)
UE rate -0.0331***
(0.003)
survey FE yes yes yes yes
country FE yes yes yes yes
N 483 483 482 476
R2 0.7596 0.7716 0.7716 0.8220
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable is the average of the SWD scores in a given coun-
try.
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Table B.7: Results including time trends
dependent: SWD (1) (2) (3) (4)
macroeconomic variables
GDP per head 0.0010 -0.0053 0.0010 0.0011
(0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002)
growth 0.0105*** 0.0108*** 0.0105*** 0.0063***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
f(inflation) -0.0188 -0.0232* -0.0188 -0.0173
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
UE rate -0.0172*** -0.0155*** -0.0172*** -0.0145***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
time - time trend - survey year FE
time 0.0030
(0.002)
country specific time trend no yes no no
ind. controls yes yes yes yes
survey FE yes yes yes yes
nation FE yes yes yes yes
N 602545 602545 602545 602545
R2 0.1433 0.1486 0.1433 0.1397
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable is a dummy.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at nation level.
(1) is the reference estimation from table A.4, column (4).
Table B.8: Influence of institutional quality: Polity IV index and Freedomhouse data
dependent: SWD (1) (2) (3) (2) (4) (5) (6)
gdphead 0.0010 0.0001 0.0006 0.0023 0.0023 0.0022 0.0023
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
growth 0.0105*** 0.0121*** 0.0109*** 0.0091** 0.0091** 0.0092** 0.0091**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
loginf -0.0188 -0.0156 -0.0182 -0.0313* -0.0313* -0.0321* -0.0313*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
uerate -0.0172*** -0.0164*** -0.0164*** -0.0169*** -0.0169*** -0.0167*** -0.0169***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
institutional quality
polity4 -0.0284
(0.035)
freedomstatus 0.0000
(0.000)
polrights 0.0245
(0.058)
civillib -0.0021
(0.016)
ind. controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
survey FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
nation FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 602545 546751 602545 576656 576656 576656 576656
R2 0.1433 0.1433 0.1435 0.1443 0.1443 0.1443 0.1443
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable is a dummy.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at nation level.
(1) is the reference estimation from table A.4, column (4). (2) is estimated on the reduced sample for which the
polity IV index is equal to its highest value 10. (3) is estimated on the subsample where the freedomhouse data
is available, i.e. years 2009 and 2010 are dropped. (4), (5), and (6) control for the indicators ‘freedom status’
(1=free, .5=partly free, 0=not free), ‘political rights’, and ‘civil liberties’ respectively. ‘Political rights’ and ‘civil
liberties’ are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of Freedom and seven the
lowest.
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Table B.9: Impact of policy variables
dependent: SWD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
macroeconomic variables
GDP per head 0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0038 -0.0013 -0.0002 0.0045 0.0038
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009)
growth 0.0105*** 0.0070* 0.0079*** 0.0070** 0.0068* 0.0062 0.0054
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
f(inflation) -0.0188 -0.0460*** -0.0468*** -0.0462*** -0.0456*** -0.0508** -0.0536**
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019)
UE rate -0.0172*** -0.0184*** -0.0159*** -0.0186*** -0.0189*** -0.0184*** -0.0162***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
policy variables
debt -0.0007
(0.001)
deficit -0.0008
(0.003)
elderly 0.0060
(0.012)
sstran -0.0043
(0.003)
ind. controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
survey FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
nation FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 602545 522403 522403 522403 522403 395936 395936
R2 0.1433 0.1496 0.1498 0.1497 0.1497 0.1553 0.1554
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable is a dummy.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at nation level.
(1) is the reference estimation from table A.4, column (4). (2) is estimated on reduced sample where debt, deficit,
and elderly is available. (6) is estimated on reduced sample where debt, deficit, elderly, and sstran is available.
The variables debt, deficit and elderly are available until 2008, sstran only until 2000.
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